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AN ESSAY ON TERM LIMITS AND A
CALL FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION
RONALD D. ROTUNDA* AND STEPHEN . SAFRANEK**
I. INTRODUCTION
While term limits on state officials are quite common,' and raise no
serious federal constitutional problems,2 term limits on federal legislators
are a different matter.' In United States Term Limits v. Thornton,4 the
Supreme Court, by a five to four majority, declared unconstitutional an
Arkansas law limiting ballot access for incumbent U.S. Senators and
Representatives after Senators had served two terms or Representatives
three terms.5
The Thornton majority held that state efforts to impose term limits
* The Albert E. Jenner, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law.
** Associate Professor of Law, University of Detroit Mercy, School of Law. He is
indebted to Diana Azzopardi for her extensive help on this article.
1. Over twenty governors now live with them. Miyazawa v. City of Cincinnati, 825 F.
Supp. 816, 821 (S.D. Ohio 1993). Municipal term limits, which date back as far as 1851, are
in effect in approximately 3,000 American cities, including such major metropolises as New
York City, Los Angeles, Houston, New Orleans, and Denver. Danielle Farge, Microcosms of
the Movement: Local Term Limits in the United States, 4 TERM LIMITS OUTLOOK SERIES 1 &
appendix, pp. 1-16 (No. 2, Aug. 1995). Term limits on state legislators are becoming more
common. As of 1994, 16 states imposed term limits on state legislators. Mark P. Petracca,
Restoring "The University in Rotation": An Essay in Defense of Term Limitation, in THE
POLITICS AND LAW OF TERM LIMITS 57 & n.1 (Edward H. Crane & Roger Pilon eds., 1994).
See generally Stephen J. Safranek, Term Limitations: Do the Winds of Change Blow
Unconstitutional?, 26 CREIGHTON L. REv. 321 (1993).
2. See, e.g., Legislature v. Eu, 816 P.2d 1309 (Cal. 1991) (rejecting free speech and equal
protection claims to term limits imposed on state legislative officials).
3. See STEPHEN J. SAFRANEI, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE FOR TERM LIMITS: THE
COURTS, THE CONGRESS, AND THE MEANING OF FEDERALISM (1993); Ronald D. Rotunda,
Rethinking Term Limits for Federal Legislators in Light of the Structure of the Constitution, 73
OR. L. REV. 561 (1994) (discussing the constitutional issues of term limits on federal
legislatures). See also Dominic A. Jannicola, Jr., People v. Constitution: The Congressional
Term Limit Debate and a Constitutional Definition of Qualification, 1994 U. ILL. L. REv. 683
(1994); Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Are Congressional Term Limits Constitutional?, 18 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (1994); Ronald D. Rotunda, The Aftermath of Thornton, 13 CONSTITU-
TIONAL COMMENTARY 201 (1996); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Term
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 109 HARv. L. REV. 78 (1995).
4. 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995), aff'g United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, 872 S.W.2d 349
(Ark. 1994).
5. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1845.
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on federal legislators are unconstitutional because
allowing the several States to adopt term limits for congressional
service would effect a fundamental change in the constitutional
framework. Any such change must come not by legislation
adopted either by Congress or by an individual State, but
rather-as have other important changes in the electoral pro-
cess-through the Amendment procedures set forth in ArticleV.6
It should be no surprise that term limit proponents are now pressing for
a constitutional amendment using the Article V provisions that authorize
amendment by constitutional convention. Our Constitution has added
twenty-seven amendments since it was first ratified by the states. Yet,
the convention method has never been used in any of these instances to
amend the Constitution.7 Does the disuse of the convention method
indicate that it is too dangerous a process to pass an amendment? Or
is the convention method a useful safety valve?
The framers of our Constitution foresaw many things. One was the
fact that the Constitution would need to be amended from time to time.
To make that process easier,8 and to guard against a Congress unwilling
to allow change,9 Article V of the United States Constitution provides
for two methods for proposing amendments. The first method allows
Congress, "whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary,"
to propose amendments and send them to the states for ratification."
6. Id. at 1871 (footnote omitted).
7. See, e.g., Walter E. Dellinger, The Recurring Question of the "Limited" Constitutional
Convention, 88 YALE L.J. 1623, 1623 (1979) ("Thus far in the history of the republic, no such
convention has been called.").
8. See Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitution: An Economic
Analysis of the Constitutional Amendment Process, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 111-13, 113 n.7
(1993). There is evidence that the framers intended to make Article V the "remedy to the
overly difficult amendment process under the Articles of Confederation." Il at 113.
Alexander Hamilton stated at the Constitutional Convention that "[i]t had been wished by
many, and was much to have been desired, that (in fact) an easier mode of introducing
amendments had been provided by the Articles of Confederation." Id. at 113 n.7 (citing 5
DEBATES ON THE ADAPTATION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 531 (Jonathon Elliot ed.,
2d ed. Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott, photo. reprint 1941) (1845)).
9. See, e.g., Ronald D. Rotunda, Bicentennial Lessons from the Constitutional Convention
of 1787, 21 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 589,620-21 (1987); see also Dellinger, supra note 7, at 1624-30
(discussing the evolution of Article V at the Philadelphia Convention).
10. Article V provides:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures
of two thirds of the several States, shall call a convention for proposing Amendments,
which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this
[Vol. 80:227
1996] AN ESSAY ON TERM LIMITS
The second method authorizes the states to apply to Congress to call a
convention. When two-thirds of the states apply, Congress "shall call a
Convention for proposing Amendments.""
Whether amendments are proposed by Congress or by a constitution-
al convention-the proposed amendments must then be ratified by three-
fourths of the states before they can become part of the Constitution.
Over the last two centuries, Congress proposed all twenty-seven
amendments that have become part of our Constitution. 2 The states
have never used the constitutional convention method, though its threat
has been very useful in prodding a reluctant Congress to act.'
3
During this same time period, Congress also proposed various
amendments that were not ratified by the requisite number of states. 4
For example, in 1861, Congress proposed an amendment that purported
to forbid any future constitutional amendment that would outlaw
slavery. This unusual proposal never became part of our Constitution
because the states refused to ratify it. Instead, in 1865, the states added
Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States,
or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of
Ratification may be proposed by Congress ....
U.S. CONST. art. V (emphasis added).
11. Id. (emphasis added).
12. Lawrence Schlam, Legislative Term Limitation Under a "Limited" Popular Initiative
Provision?, 14 N. ILL. U. L. Rnv. 1, 33-34 (1993).
13. See, e.g., Dellinger, supra note 7, at 1623. In 1979, thirty states submitted
applications asking Congress to call a convention to consider a mandatory balanced federal
budget amendment. Id. Congress was purportedly brought "to the brink of calling a
constitutional convention" because only four more applications were required. Id (quoting
NAT'L L.J., Mar. 5, 1979 at 1, col. 2).
14. Although Congress has proposed numerous amendments to the Constitution, the
states have only ratified 27 amendments and failed to ratify six amendments. RICHARD B.
BERNSTEIN & JEROME ANGEL, AMENDING AMERICA: IF WE LovE THE CONSTITUTION SO
MUCH, WHY Do WE KEEP TRYING TO CHANGE IT? 169 (1993). Unratified amendments
proposed by Congress have dealt with various subjects, such as calculating representation in
the House of Representatives, losing citizenship if a citizen accepts a title of nobility, outlawing
child labor, prohibiting sex discrimination, and treating the District of Colombia as if it were
a state. See Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 8, at 152 n.201; 4 RONALD D. ROTUNDA &
JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE
(app.M) 779-82 (2d ed. 1992) (adapted from THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. DOC. NO. 92-82, at 51-52 (2d Sess. 1973)).
15. 4 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 14, app.M at 780. The amendment stated, "[n]o
amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will authorize or give to Congress the
power to abolish or interfere, within any State, with the domestic institutions thereof, including
that of persons held to labor or service by the laws of said State." Id. See also Eric Grant,
Responding to Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of Constitutional Amendment, 13 CONST.
COMMENTARY 125, 126-27 n.6 (1996) (book review).
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the Thirteenth Amendment, which forever abolished slavery.6
Supporters of term limits for Congress are now considering the
enactment of a constitutional amendment to provide term limits.' 7
Recognizing that Representatives and Senators are generally unwilling
to give up the perks of long-time incumbency, 8 the term limit propo-
nents are now considering the resurrection of the Article V convention
method to ratify the amendment. This article will provide a brief
analysis of the convention method for amending the Constitution.
Critics of the convention method have argued that it is an untried
process and, therefore, must be dangerous. t9  They argue that a
convention could "run away" beyond its mandate, rewrite the entire
Constitution, and even repeal the Bill of Rights.' ° Such charges are not
only unfounded, but they also show a strong distrust of democracy and
a fear of the voter's judgment. Although the claims that a convention
will repeal the Bill of Rights, or other similar behavior, are groundless,
their constant repetition gives people qualms. Thus, this issue deserves
detailed analysis.
Once the parameters of Article V are understood, it is apparent that
fear of its use is unjustified. The framers anticipated problems by
requiring that any proposed amendment offered by a convention, just as
any proposal that Congress offered, be ratified by three-quarters of the
states. 2' It is no more likely today that three-quarters of the states will
16. 4 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 14, app.N at 798.
17. Schlam, supra note 12, at 33.
18. In a study evaluating the possible success of a term limit amendment, Professors
Boudreaux & Pritchard conclude that the amendment has "little prospect of success, because
Congress is unlikely to restrict its own ability to extract money and votes." Boudreaux &
Pritchard, supra note 8, at 157; see also Schlam, supra note 12, at 36-37.
19. Laurence H. Tribe, Issues Raised by Requesting Congress to Call a Constitutional
Convention to Propose a Balanced Budget Amendment, 10 PAC. L.J. 627, 628 (1979) (calling
a convention for proposing a balanced budget amendment "a needless and perilous under-
taking ... likely to invite division and confrontation where unity and cooperation are critical,
one likely to thwart rather than vindicate the will of the American people and damage rather
than mend the Constitution.").
20. For a sampling of the academic debate regarding a constitutional convention as a
means of amending the Constitution, see, Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory ofArticle
V: The Constitutional Lessons of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677, 733 n.194
(1993). See also Paul Reidinger, et al., We the People: Is the Constitution Out of Date?, A.B.A.
J., Sept. 1, 1987, at 52, 54 (presenting a debate between two prominent legal academics on
Constitutional Conventions in which Derrick Bell of Harvard Law School state, "[i]t's certainly
a possibility that a constitutional convention might repeal the Bill of Rights.").
21. The language of Article V is crystal clear. See U.S. CONST. art. V, supra note 10.
Justice Story expressed no concern about the power of the states to call for a constitutional
convention. He treated both methods of constitutional amendment equally, and noted, in his
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ratify a bizarre constitutional amendment than it was likely in 1861 that
three-quarters of states would ratify an amendment to protect the
immoral practice of slavery. The framers' fail-safe system in Article V
of the Constitution worked in 1861, and it will work today.
Constitutional conventions, like constitutional amendments proposed
by Congress, should not be taken lightly. However, the convention
method does not threaten constitutional rights as feared by critics. The
convention method is a necessary and integral part of the Constitution
that must remain available to state legislators, and the people they serve,
to ensure that Congress serves the people, rather than its own self-
interest. As Abraham Lincoln noted in his first inaugural address:
I will venture to add that, to me, the convention mode seems
preferable, in that it allows amendments to originate with the
people themselves, instead of only permitting them to take, or
reject, propositions, originated by others, not especially chosen for
the purpose, and which might not be precisely such, as they would
wish to either accept or refuse.22
The convention method of amendment is a critical component of the
constitutional balance of power because it acts as a safety valve for
proposing amendments. Congress has proposed numerous constitutional
amendments and some of these amendments have directly limited state
power?23 However, none of the proposed amendments have directly
limited congressional power. The framers of the Constitution anticipated
that Congress would be reluctant to make proposals that would reduce
its own powers.24 Thus, the framers created the convention method as
influential treatise:
Congress, whenever two thirds of each house shall concur in the expediency of an
amendment, may propose it for adoption. The legislature of two thirds of the states
may require a convention to be called, for the purpose of proposing amendments.
In each case, three fourths of the states, either through their legislatures, or conventions,
called for the purpose, must concur in every amendment, before it becomes a part of
the constitution.
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 959, at 680
(1833) (emphasis added).
22. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (March 4, 1861), reprinted in 4 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 270 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) (emphasis added).
23. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XVII, XX.
24. Partick Henry, From the Virginia Convention, in THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN AMERICA 102-03 (John R. Vile ed., 1993) ("Let us suppose-for
the case is supposable, possible, and probable-that you happen to deal those powers to
unworthy hands; will they relinquish powers already in their possession, or agree to




an important safety valve to propose needed amendments when federal
lawmakers impede reform. Indeed, history has shown that even the
looming possibility of a convention can be enough to force Congress to
act. Without this safety valve, the Seventeenth Amendment, providing
for the direct popular election of Senators, might never have come to
be72
II. THE DRAFTING OF ARTICLE V
Congress proposed all twenty-seven amendments that are now part
of our Constitution.26 The absence of a single Article V convention
would have surprised the framers of the Constitution because they
thought that Congress and conventions would be equally viable
mechanisms in the amending process.2 7 In fact, many of the framers
preferred the convention method.
The first suggestion for an amendment provision at the Constitutional
Convention of 1787 did not include any role for Congress.' The
Virginia Plan, one of the major proposals that led to our Constitution,
simply stated that "provision ought to be made for the amendment of
the Articles of Union whensoever it shall seem necessary, and that the
assent of the National Legislature ought not to be required ....""
This approach was hardly surprising because it merely paralleled the
current state practices. In 1787, of the eight states with an amendment
process, only three provided a role for their legislatures. 0 Thus, when
the Philadelphia Convention's "Committee of Detail" first drafted
Article V, the sole method of amending the Constitution was the
convention method.31 There was no role at all for Congress.
Several delegates to the Constitutional Convention objected to the
25. 137 Cong. Rec. S559-63 (daily ed. Jan. 15, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hatch), reprinted
in THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN AMERICA 482 (John R.
Vile ed., 1993) ("The 17th Amendment to the Constitution, for example, -providing for the
direct election of U.S. Senators-was proposed by Congress in 1912 in response to an effort
in the States to call a convention on this subject.").
26. See Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 8, at 152 n.201.
27. LESTER BERNHARDT ORFIELD, THE AMENDING OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
53 (1942).
28. Id. at 1-2.
29. Proceedings of Convention, The Virginia Plan (May 29, 1787), in 1 THE RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 22 (Max Farrand ed., 2d ed. 1937).
30. See SPECIAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION STUDY COMMITrEE, A.B.A.,
AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE CONVENTION METHOD UNDER ARTICLE V 15
(1974) [hereinafter A.B.A.].
31. Id. at 17-20.
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Committee's first draft because they feared it would give the states
excessive power at the expense of Congress. 2 A major factor that lead
to the Constitutional Convention was that the Articles of Confederation
created a weak central government.33 The drafters recognized this
problem and did not wish to repeat the mistakes that existed under the
Articles. 4 The delegates of the Constitutional Convention compro-
mised and settled on what became Article V, which authorized both the
states and Congress to play an equal role in proposing amendments.
This two-pronged method for proposing amendments ensured that no
single institution could block important amendments. As George Mason
of Virginia declared, it would be improper to require congressional
approval of amendments "because they may abuse their power, and
refuse their consent on that very account. 3 6 And James Madison later
emphasized that Article V "equally enables the general and the State
governments to originate the amendment of errors.. .. "I'
III. PAST USES OF THE CONVENTION CLAUSE
No convention has ever been called to propose amendments under
Article V. Since the turn of this century, most convention applications
have been limited to specific issues that Congress refused or failed to
address.3" Five times during this century, more than half of the states
have requested a convention to deal with a particular issue.39
The Article V Convention Clause was most effectively used during
the campaign for the direct election of U.S. Senators.4 ° With the rise
of the Progressive movement in the 1890s, sentiment grew for the direct,
popular election of U.S. Senators, as opposed to the election of Senators
by state legislatures, as the Constitution originally provided.4' Between
32. PAUL J. WEBER & BARBARA A. PERRY, UNFOUNDED FEARS: MYTHS AND
REALITIES OF A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 13-18 (1989).
33. l
34. See generally Vile, supra note 25, at 66-67.
35. Id. at 73-74.
36. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LIMITED CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERVENTIONS UNDER ARTICLE V OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 7 (Sept. 10,
1987).
37. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS No. 43, at 284 (James Madison) (Isaac Krammick ed.
1987).
38. See WEBER & PERRY, supra note 32, at 55-75.
39. Id at 61-75.
40. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 14, at 771-72 (2d ed. 1992).
41. JOHN R. VILE, CONTEMPORARY QUESTIONS SURROUNDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDING PROCESS 7 (1993).
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1894 and 1902, the House of Representatives passed several resolutions
proposing a constitutional amendment requiring direct election.42
However, the Senate refused to vote on the issue because many of its
members would have lost their jobs if they had to win popular support.
The states turned to the convention provision of Article V to force
Congress's hand.43 Between 1893 and 1911, some thirty states called for
a convention to propose an amendment requiring direct election, only
one short of the thirty-one needed to trigger the convention process.'
In addition to widespread state approval, many more Senators favored
electoral reform because they themselves were the product of direct
elections in which reform minded state legislatures promised voters that
it would select the candidates who had won unofficial direct elections.'
On May 13, 1912, the Senate finally approved the direct election
amendment to avoid the prospect of a convention.46 It was sent to the
states for ratification, where it easily obtained approval of three-fourths
of the states and became the Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion in 1913. 47 Thus, no convention was called because Article V served
its purpose as a safety valve by removing the congressional roadblock to
the amending process and serving as the impetus to force Congress's
hand.
Supporters of the current campaign for a convention to propose a
term limit amendment think that a similar institutional roadblock exists
today.48 Like Senators in the early 1900s, current members of Congress
naturally oppose term limits because such limits restrict their ten-
ure-particularly Representatives, who are often protected by gerryman-
42. WEBER & PERRY, supra note 32, at 61.
43. See VILE, supra note 41, at 7.
44. There were forty-six states in the Union in 1911. Some commentators claim that
thirty-one states in fact did request a convention. However, the exact number of applications
remains unsettled because of the inconsistent way in which the applications were recorded.
See A.B.A., supra note 30, at 60-63.
45. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA, TERM LIMITS AND LESSONS FROM OUR PAST, Heartland
Policy Study, No. 66 (June 28, 1995) (discussing the enactment of the Seventeenth
Amendment).
46. 37 Stat. 646 (1912).
47. See Paul J. Weber, The Constitutional Convention: A Safe Political Option, 3 J.L. &
POL. 51, 57-58 (1986). See generally Todd J. Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests: An
Interest Group Explanation of the Seventeenth Amendment, 73 OR. L. REv. 1007 (1994)
(discussing special interest groups and the Seventeenth Amendment).
48. Indeed, Congress never passed the tenth item in the Republican Party's Contract
with America. See 141 CONG. REC. H182-04 (daily ed. Jan. 11, 1995) (statement of Rep. Fox)
("In the next 93 days we will vote on the following 10 items .... [including] Congressional
term limits to make Congress a citizen legislature.").
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dered congressional districts.4 9 Therefore, it is natural to turn to the
Article V convention mechanism to mandate electoral reform. 0
IV. MYTH OF THE RUNAWAY CONVENTION
The most common question surrounding the Article V Convention
Clause is whether a convention's mandate could legally be limited to
address only certain subjects, or whether it would be free to rewrite the
entire Constitution, as was done with the Articles of Confederation in
1787. The experience with the Constitutional Convention of 1787 was
a successful one: it led to our present Constitution, which has given us
freedom without license and stability without dictatorship. Yet, critics
of a convention, oddly enough, cite the Convention of 1787 as something
to fear.5'
Opponents of the convention method argue that a convention, by its
nature, cannot be limited and that the delegates, if they were so inclined,
could revise the entire Constitution, including the Bill of Rights. 52
These fears, however, are unwarranted because a convention cannot
revise anything, it can only propose. Numerous restraints, political as
well as practical, make it impossible for a convention to rewrite the
Constitution against the wishes of the American people.53
49. Lincoln J. Connolly, Case Note, Mowing Down a Grass Roots Movement But
Protecting the Crabgrass: Congressional Term Limits Are Constitutional, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV.
661, 705 (noting that both South Dakota (in 1989) and Utah (in 1990) have petitioned Con-
gress for a constitutional convention regarding a term limits amendment).
50. Id. at 703.
51. See Paulsen, supra note 20, at 742.
The very nature of a constitutional convention ... is inherently illimitable in what
it may propose. In'that sense, any federal constitutional convention is necessarily a
"runaway" convention. Certainly the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 fits this
characterization. The delegates pressed the outer limits of their authority in
proposing not simply amendments to the Articles of Confederation, but an entirely
new frame of government. A constitutional convention today would have no less
power to run away from existing structures and practices and propose radically new
government arrangements and greatly enlarged-or diminished-individual rights.
Id.
52. Id.; Reidinger, supra note 20, at 54. The fears may arise from the fact that Article
V was created as a peaceful alternative to a revolution. Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of
Constitutional Change: Rethinking the Amending Process, 97 HARV. L. REV. 431, 438 (1983)
("The formal amending process set forth in Article V represents a domestication of the right
to revolution.").
53. See Arthur E. Bonfield, The Dirksen Amendment and the Article V Convention
Process, 66 MICH. L. REV. 949, 998 (1968) (noting that a "runaway convention is no real
danger since the power of the states and Congress [to limit the scope of a constitutional
convention] ... is based on a sound legal and practical basis.").
1996]
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A. Legal Limitations on Conventions Under Article V
A convention under Article V need not have a broad scope. Article
V does not refer to a convention for the purpose of rewriting or even
revising the Constitution, but actually offers a more modest alternative.
Article V specifically refers to "a Convention for proposing Amend-
ments."54 Therefore, a convention does not have the power to repeal
the Constitution; it can only propose amendments or alterations to the
Constitution, i.e., "modifications" or "revisions"."
The Framers did not fear an Article V Convention. For instance,
Alexander Hamilton, in The Federalist Papers, stated that "every
amendment to the Constitution, if once established would be a single
proposition .... There can, therefore, be no comparison between the
facility of effecting an amendment and that of establishing, in the first
instance, a complete Constitution."56 Specific amendments, rather than
a comprehensive rewrite of the Constitution, are what the Framers would
have expected.
B. Limiting the Convention's Mandate
Despite Alexander Hamilton's view, commentators today often
disagree whether a convention could, in fact, be legally prohibited from
considering amendments on more than one subject. 7 Some commenta-
tors argue that neither Article V, nor the Constitution in general,
answers the question of whether a convention's scope may be limited.
In 1974, a special committee of the American Bar Association
(ABA), after a two-year study, concluded that the Constitution allows
limitations on the scope of conventions." The committee based its
determination on several factors. It noted that early drafts of Article V
indicated that conventions were to be limited to particular subjects.59
The Committee of Detail's initial draft of Article V provided, "[o]n the
application of the Legislatures of two-thirds of the States of the Union,
for an amendment of this Constitution, the Legislature of the United
States shall call a Convention for that purpose.' 6)
54. U.S. CONST. art. V.
55. See id.
56. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS No. 85 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 37, at 485.
57. See Paulsen, supra note 20, at 737, 737 n.202.
58. See A.B.A., supra note 30, at 15.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 12.
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The ABA committee concluded that the phrase "for that purpose"
indicates an intent that conventions would only be called for certain
discrete purposes without authority to conduct a general review of the
Constitution. Moreover, limited conventions were in line with the
standard practice among state constitutional conventions at that time.
Most of the state constitutions that provided for conventions explicitly
stated that the conventions could be limited to particular issues.6'
The ABA committee also concluded that sound policy reasons
support the view that states should be able to call limited conventions.
The convention method of proposing an amendment was meant to be a
workable alternative to proposing an amendment by Congress.62
However, states may not employ this option if the convention agendas
are not limited to particular proposals. In addition, the Committee
found a limited convention to be more consistent with democratic
principles because the voters would be better able to exercise their
franchise if they knew the subject matter to be considered before electing
delegates. If the range of topics to be addressed were known and
limited, the public would be better able to exercise an informed
judgment when choosing among different candidates.
Other commentators have disagreed and claimed that neither
Congress, nor the states, can limit the specific topics to be addressed at
a convention.63 Indeed, some have even argued that a state application
for anything other than a "general" convention is invalid.' Under this
view, the application of every individual state to Congress might have to
be phrased identically, each one calling for a convention with no limits
to its jurisdiction.65
This view is illogical. Regardless of whether the states can impose
61. ld at 15.
62. See supra note 8.
63. See Paulsen, supra note 20, at 736-37.
64. See Schlam, supra note 12, at 38 n.152. See also Charles L. Black, Jr., Amending the
Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 82 YALE L.J. 189 (1972); Dellinger, supra note 7, at
1623 (arguing that while a convention should be influenced in its choice of agenda by the
grievances that led the states to apply for its convocation, the authority to determine the
agenda and draft the amendments to be proposed should rest with the convention, rather than
with Congress or the state legislature); Walter E. Dellinger, Who Controls a Constitutional
Convention?- A Response, 1979 DUKE L.. 999 (1979) [hereinafter Who Controls a
Convention]; Francis H. Heller, Limiting a Constitutional Convention: The State Precedents, 3
CARDOZO L. REV. 563 (1982) (arguing that states may not limit a convention).
65. Arthur J. Goldberg, The Proposed Constitutional Convention, 11 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 1 (1983); Thomas H. Kean, A Constitutional Convention Would Threaten the Rights We
Have Cherished for 200 Years, 4 DET. C.L. REv. 1087 (1986); Robert M. Rhodes, A Limited
Federal Constitutional Convention, 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 1 (1973).
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limits on their call for a convention, it is hard to find language in Article
V requiring that the applications use identical language. If the Framers
wanted only certain incantations to be used, they would have provided
the appropriate language-which they did when they wrote other
sections of the Constitution.66
Those who believe that neither the states nor Congress can limit the
jurisdiction of a convention also argue that the language in Article V
referring to "a Convention for proposing Amendments" authorizes "a
convention for proposing such amendments as that convention decides
to propose. '67 Under this view, once a convention is summoned, it is
a "free agent," authorized to ignore the reasons that led to its cre-
ation.68 These commentators believe that even if the convention were
called for a specific purpose, and Congress limits the mandate to
proposing amendments that address that specific purpose,69 Congress
is still bound to submit to the states whatever proposals the convention
formulates for ratification, even if the convention consciously rejected
the mandate that led to its creation.70
This argument makes two assumptions. First, when Article V refers
to "proposing amendments," it does not limit a convention to proposing
amendments; indeed a runaway convention could propose to throw away
the whole Constitution and start from scratch. a Second, although the
states and Congress intended to limit the convention to a particular
matter and the convention might be lawless in ignoring those limits,
Congress must be a mere conduit and it must respect the work of the
convention, even when the convention violated the rules that created it.
Even if one accepts the scenario of a runaway and lawless conven-
tion, Article V imposes several significant checks on the convention.
These safeguards may help explain why President Lincoln did not fear
66. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (referring to the requirements for oath of office).
67. Paulsen, supra note 20, at 738 (footnote omitted).
68. Gerald Gunther, The Convention Method of Amending the United States Constitution,
14 GA. L. REV. 14-18 (1979); William W. Van Alstyne, Does Article V Restrict the States to
Calling Unlimited Conventions Only?- A Letter to a Colleague, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1295, 1298,
1305 (1979).
69. John T. Noonan, Jr., The Convention Method of Constitutional Amendment- Its
Meaning, Usefulness, and Wisdom, 10 PAC. L.J. 641 (1979) (asserting that the convention
cannot go beyond what Congress has specified).
70. Paulsen, supra note 20, at 738.
71. A few scholars claim that a convention would cause chaos in an otherwise orderly
government. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 65, at 2 (calling the convention system "uncharted
and volatile"); Tribe, supra note 19, at 632 (calling the convention system "exceedingly
unsound").
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the convention method, but actually preferred it.72 Let us turn now to
these safeguards.
C. The Ratification Requirement
The first significant check on the convention method of amendment
is that all proposed amendments must be ratified by three-fourths of the
states before they become part of the Constitution. Article V makes this
requirement explicit and no other interpretation is possible. Therefore,
the critics' fear of a runaway convention is unfounded. Even if a
runaway convention violated its mandate, the convention can only
propose amendments and these amendments then must go through the
arduous state-by-state ratification process.
The historical evidence demonstrates that gaining support in thirty-
eight states is not an easy task, even for amendments with broad popular
support. The last two amendments proposed by Congress, the popular
equal rights amendment and an amendment to provide the District of
Columbia with representation in Congress, both failed in their bids for
ratification. The convention proposals face a difficult ratification process
even when a majority of the states support the proposal because the
constitution requires a three-quarters super-majority. 3  Therefore, a
drastic rewriting of the Constitution could occur only if an overwhelming
majority of the American people wanted such a rewrite.
D. The Ratification Process
If a convention still strayed and proposed constitutional amendments
outside of its designated subject matter, despite the political restraints
imposed in the delegate selection process, those amendments would face
a second obstacle: Congress. Article V explicitly gives Congress the sole
power to control the method of ratification. Congress decides whether
the ratification process of three-fourths of the states occurs through state
72. Abraham Lincoln stated, "I should, under existing circumstances, favor, rather than
oppose, a fair opportunity [sic] being afforded the people to act upon it." Lincoln, First
Inaugural Address, reprinted in 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra
note 22, at 269.
73. One commentator has stated, "the dominant function of Article V... is not to
facilitate, but to clog.... ." Van Alstyne, supra note 68, at 1299. See State ex rel. Harper v.
Waltermire, 691 P.2d 826, 830-31 (Mont. 1984) (discussing the nature of supermajority voting
and the specific means by which a constitutional convention can be called). See also Myers
v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Constitutional Constancy, Why Congress Should Cure Itself of Amendment Fever, 17 CARDOZO
L. REV. 691 (1996).
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conventions or state legislatures.74
If Congress requires the states to use ratifying conventions, the
people will have to elect delegates to represent them in the conventions.
These elections will provide the people with a greater power to control
the results of the amending process. The state conventions are called for
the specific purpose of deciding whether to ratify particular proposed
amendments. As a result, the people will know where the delegates
stand on the issue of ratification at the time they select the convention
delegates. If Congress provides for ratification by three-quarters of the
state legislatures, the state representatives and senators will decide
whether to ratify the proposed amendments. However, these representa-
tives and senators have already been elected and were not chosen to
decide whether to accept a proposed amendment. The people will not
know where the representatives stand on the issue of ratification and,
thus, they cannot control the results of the amending process.
Congress's power to choose the method of ratification also serves as
an obstacle against the runaway convention by limiting the convention's
ability to submit proposed amendments. Under Article V, a convention
may not submit amendments to the states for ratification until Congress
chooses the "Mode of Ratification." This limitation gives Congress the
power to control how amendments that exceed the convention's charge
will be ratified. Some have even argued that Congress could simply
decline to choose a method of ratification if the proposed amendments
extend beyond the legal scope of the convention.75 If this occurs, the
proposed amendments would not be able to go any further.
However, Congress should only exercise this option if the proposed
amendments were outside the legal scope of the convention. Congress
could not, consistent with the Constitution, block validly adopted
proposals. While a determination of the convention's scope of legal
authority in each case would be difficult, the real danger facing the
people, given Congress's interest in the matter, is that the convention
74. Congress exercises control over ratification. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433
(1939); Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921); see also AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INST., A
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION: How WELL WOULD IT WORK? 22-23 (1979); STAFF OF
HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., STATE APPLICATIONS ASKING CONGRESS
TO CALL A FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 11-16 (Comm. Print 1961). The Court
in Hawke v. Smith, stated that the framers' intent was clear; the use of "legislatures" within
the ratification process called for an "action by deliberative assemblages representative of the
people .. " Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 227 (1920).
75. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 36, at 43.
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would be circumscribed too much, not too little.76
E. Election of Delegates
If Congress chooses to have the proposed amendment ratified by
convention in each of the states, the procedures for the election of these
delegates to the conventions will have to be decided." Article V does
not specify how or when delegates to a convention would be chosen."
Congress, which is given the responsibility to call the convention,79
should also have the final power to specify the election procedures.
Congress might decide to defer to state procedures, or enact its own
procedures. Thus, while Congress has no choice but to call a convention
once the requisite number of valid state applications has been re-
ceived, o the power to "call" should give it an opportunity to craft the
process by which delegates will be selected."
Using this power, Congress could create an election process that
would maximize the public debate on the issue and ensure the account-
ability of the delegates. Congress could also provide for adequate debate
by establishing a longer campaign period. The campaign would probably
generate intense media and public interest because it would be the first
convention that has ever been held to ratify an amendment.' The
increased media exposure would draw political parties and interest
groups into the campaign and ensure a spirited discussion of the issues.
During the campaign, the convention candidates would have to
express their position on the relevant issues, such as whether they would
attempt to lead the convention away from its defined subject matter.
Thus, delegates would have to commit themselves to a position on the
76. RUSSELL CAPLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL BRINKSMANSHIP: AMENDING THE CONSTITU-
TION BY NATIONAL CONVENTION 146-49 (1988). For a review of this book, see Anita
Bernstein, Statesmanship:A Review of Constitutional Brinksmanship Amending the Constitution
by National Convention, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 802 (1990).
77. See Jonathon L. Wolcoff, Note, The Unconstitutionality of Voter Initiative
Applications for Federal Constitutional Conventions, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1525 (1985); see also
Dellinger, Who Controls a Convention, supra note 64, at 999. In Leser v. Garnett, the Supreme
Court stated that the process is a federal function; accordingly it is to be "derived from the
Federal Constitution ... it transcends any limitations sought to be imposed by the people of
a State." Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 137 (1922).
78. U.S. CONST. art. V.
79. Id.
80. "The mandatory language of Article V is inescapable: upon application of the
requisite number of states, Congress 'shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments."'
Paulsen, supra note 20, at 756 (citing U.S. CONST. art. V).
81. A.B.A., supra note 30, at 9.
82. LAWRENCE M. FREIDMAN, AMERICAN LAW 184 (1984).
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question of a runaway convention before they were elected. 3 While
the delegates' promises would not be any more legally binding than the
promises of any other politician, the public scrutiny of the candidates
would impose difficult, if not insurmountable, barriers on any efforts to
lead the convention beyond its legal scope.84
Some people fear that because the convention method has never
been tried, its use will lead to chaos.85 However, the history of the
ratification process for the Twenty-First Amendment shows that such
fears are invalid. This history starts with the Eighteenth Amendment
which enacted National Prohibition.86 After the people sobered up,
they ratified the Twenty-First Amendment to repeal the Eighteenth.'
Prior to the Twenty-First Amendment, all amendments had been
ratified by state legislatures.88 However, Congress chose a different
vehicle to ratify the Twenty-First Amendment: state conventions. To
this day, the Twenty-First Amendment is the only amendment that has
been ratified by state conventions.89
One of the most important issues through the ratification process was
the method by which the people would elect convention delegates to the
state conventions that would vote on the Twenty-First Amendment. This
question centered on whether delegates would be chosen by state-wide
or local elections. At the time, Congress made no decision on this issue.
Consequently, the states stepped into the vacuum. About half of the
states had provisions in their state constitutions regarding state constitu-
tional conventions," but none of them addressed a federal convention.
The absence of a clear rule in Article V did not lead to chaos. On the
83. See Weber, supra note 47, at 61-63; WEBER & PERRY supra note 32, at 75-77, for a
more detailed discussion of the profitable nature of a convention delegate campaign.
84. See Schlam, supra note 12, at 38-39, regarding delegates to a national constitutional
convention.
85. See, e.g., Reidinger, supra note 20, at 54.
86. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. CONsT. amend. XXI.
87. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
88. See Dellinger, supra note 7, at 1623.
89. Noel T. Dowling, A New Experiment in Ratification, 19 A.B.A. J. 383 (1933).
Dowling wrote that the Twenty-First Amendment
was projected into a perfectly clear legal field: not a constitutional provision, not a
statute, not a decision-nothing specifically in point-either to guide or to warn.
Something more was involved than the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment
.... Here was the beginning of a new experiment in government, perhaps of great
significance for the future operation of the American system. A different method of
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contrary, states simply proceeded according to the provisions and
procedures in the state constitutions. Despite the novelty of the state
convention method, "a clear demonstration has been given of what can
be accomplished, even in legislation of a novel character, when the
objective is definite and the public insistent."'"
F Review by the Courts
Any proposed amendments that exceed a convention's powers would
invite a legal challenge. There has been considerable controversy
regarding the Court's jurisdiction in these matters. In 1939, in Coleman
v. Miller,9" the Court, when asked to decide whether Kansas had validly
ratified a proposed child labor amendment to the federal Constitution,
treated the case as nonjusticiable.93 It declined to rule on the issue,
stating that questions regarding the amendment process were "political
questions" and should be decided by Congress and the President without
judicial intervention.94 Commentators have differed on the question of
whether the modem Supreme Court would, or should, decide questions
dealing with the constitutionality of amendments to the Constitution.95
V. CONCLUSION
Given the numerous safeguards built into the convention method of
amending the Constitution under Article V, fears regarding the use of
this method are unfounded. In fact, the convention method provides
greater protection than the Congressional method. The convention
method, favored by people such as President Lincoln,96 is subject to
many constraints, but Congress may propose an amendment to the states
at any time with no limits on the subject matter of those amendments.
While Congress is unlikely to propose a term limits amendment,
91. Id.
92. 307 U.S. 433 (1939). See also Ronald D. Rotunda, Running Out of Time: Can the
E.R.A. Be Saved, 64 A.B.A. J. 1504, 1507 (1978) (discussing Coleman v. Miller and the
"political questions" doctrine); VILE, supra note 41, at 23.
93. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 456.
94. Id at 450.
95. See Stewart Dalzell & Eric J. Beste, Is the Twenty-Seventh Amendment 200 Years
Too Late?, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 501, 544-45 (1994) (arguing that the question is
justiciable). Other commentators argue that such issues should be nonjusticiable and are
inappropriate for judicial review. See also ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 14, at 283-286.
See, e.g., Fritz W. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis,
75 YALE L. J. 517, 589 (1966).
96. Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, reprinted in 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 22, at 269.
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thirty-four state legislatures may well petition Congress to convene a
convention. Proponents of this action maintain that Congress is
incapable of limiting its own terms, therefore, a convention is necessary.
Opponents fear any use of conventions, even though Article V specifical-
ly approves of this method. They claim that convention delegates might
mount an assault on the Constitution. However, the convention method
of amendment is not only a safe method of amendment, it is also an
integral part of the constitutional system of checks and balances. The
Framers wisely intended the convention method to be a vital counter-
weight against Congress' power to block amendments. As the campaign
for direct elections to the U.S. Senate demonstrated, the threat of a
convention is sometimes necessary to force consideration of amendments
that challenge the self-interest of Capital Hill lawmakers.
The convening of a convention is, of course, a serious and complex
matter. It should not be taken lightly. Americans and their representa-
tives in state legislatures and in Congress should not allow misinforma-
tion to divert them from employing this wisely crafted provision. When
Congress fails to propose needed constitutional amendments, policy
makers should not hesitate to use the convention method of amendment.
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